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RECENT DECISIONS
supra, private suits against these companies have benefited from the
Court's exhaustive and authoritative analysis. But, as the cases increase
in number the requirements for inferring conspiracy decrease. At-
tempts to interpose more rigid standards have been unsuccessful.
Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., supra; Bordonaro Bros.
Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 176 F. (2d) 594, 597
(2d Cir. 1949). A recent review of the problem in Fanchon & Marco
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal. 1951), takes
into consideration the simple truth that the "clearance" and "run"
system has become a generally accepted state of affairs. This is true
throughout the industry and has become a habit with the public. In
Fanchon no unreasonableness was found in the application of the
system to the independent exhibitor. This distinguishes Fanchon from
the instant case where the treatment of the drive-in was not based
on any particular factual references. Without being given a com-
petitive test, the drive-in was uniformly assigned to the second-run spot.
When the rule of the instant case is viewed out of the context of the
circumstances, it could hardly win unquestioned approval. Behind the
inference, however, stands firm evidence of unlawful combination used
to suppress competition. In carrying out the policy of the anti-trust
laws, a careful, judicious, case-by-case approach is needed to prevent
misuse of any conspiracy formula. As stated in Fanchon & Marco v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra, 100 F. Supp. at 104, "No parallelism,
conscious or unconscious, can overcome a finding of reasonableness."
William J. Hurley
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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS. By Frank E. Cooper.'
Ann.Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1951. Pp. xxv,
470. $5.00.-The rise of the administrative agency to its present
position of power and prestige is perhaps the most significant develop-
ment in American jurisprudence during the past half century. Its way
has not been easy. The philosophy that gave it birth compromised a
principle that the American people have long cherished - the doctrine
of separation of powers under which the legislative, judicial and execu-
tive functions are supposed to be neatly compartmentalized. The
result was an immediate hostility from which administrative institutions
have never been freed.
The familiar charges that the administrative agency is a usurping
"fourth branch" of government or that it is an "unholy combination"
1 Member of the Detroit Bar; Visiting Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School.
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of policeman, prosecutor and judge, threatening our basic liberties,
stem, no doubt, from a perfervid faith in the strict tripartite form
of government, if not from a dislike of having one's life or business
regulated. Equally publicized have been the claims advanced by the
advocates of the administrative process. The rise of industrialism and
the power of giant industries, it is said, demanded a new set of
economic and social controls that were beyond the competence of
any of the three conventional branches of government. The invest-
ment banking business might be cited as a case in point. The debacle
of 1929 and the subsequent congressional revelations pointed to an
obvious need for government intervention. The issuance of new securi-
ties and trading on the national exchanges required continuous super-
vision, great expertise, flexibility in procedures and in rule-making,
and, with it all, a sense of mission, No court or legislative body, it is
claimed - and the statement is not easily challenged - could do
the job.
Today the issue would no longer appear to be whether we shall
have administrative agencies, but rather how they are to be kept
within bounds. The difficulties encountered in granting to an agency
enough power and freedom of action to perform its function, but not
so much that it overruns the liberties of the citizens are formidable
indeed and have taxed the ingenuity of the legislature and the courts.
Fitting the administrative process into our present constitutional
framework, rather than according it the equality of a coordinate
branch of government, has provided both conceptual and practical
problems of a high order.
Unlike the British who rely upon Parliament to check the ex-
cesses of administrative action, we look to the courts to exercise the
principal restraints. The legislature, to be sure, starts the agency on
its way, and in the typical case endows it with broad powers and holds
it accountable to prescribed standards, albeit fairly loose ones. To the
courts is left the task of defining the statutory bounds, keeping the
agency within them, passing upon the fairness and adequacy of the
agency's procedures and adjudicating the constitutional issues that
seem continually to beset the administrative process.
The relation of the courts to the administrative process is the central
theme of Professor Cooper's book. The author's purpose, to paraphrase
his own statement, is to bring together the leading cases which have
laid down the principles that govern the decision of litigated matters
before the agencies and to describe the criteria and techniques of
administrative adjudication within the standards imposed by the
courts. The result is a basic survey of the administrative process that
should have appeal both to the law student and the practitioner.
The major parts of the book are familiar: The Place of Adminis-
trative Agencies in the Judicial System, Underlying Constitutional
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Questions, Procedure in Adjudication of Cases, Rule Making and
Judicial Review. The section on Adjudication of Cases - the so-called
quasi-judicial function of administrative bodies - is particularly
excellent. It is in this area that public criticism has been the most
vociferous and perhaps the most justified. The author's approach to
the topic is refreshingly dispassionate. He does not commence with
an answer but rather with the problem. After making out a convincing
case establishing that an administrative'agency cannot function as a
court if it is to accomplish its assigned task, he goes on to make specific
recommendations for the improvement of administrative procedures.
He calls for major revisions in pre-hearing conferences, the conduct
of the hearing itself, the separation of prosecuting and adjudicative
functions, the presentation of evidence and in post-hearing procedure.
The author treats the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions
of both state and federal agencies. If the book has any major short-
coming, it is that the breadth of the survey precludes much analysis
in depth. The Administrative Procedure Act 2 which has brought
considerable uniformity to the rule-making and adjudicative functions
of the federal agencies, particularly in such areas as notice, hearing,
separation of functions, admission of evidence and scope of judicial
review, receives frequent but cursory mention. It could, and perhaps
should, be the core of any current treatise on the subject of adminis-
trative law.
The author's style is somewhat turgid. There seems to be some-
thing about legal writing that stifles originality. Most treatises have
the literary qualities of a law review note. But law books, fortunately,
are not read for their stirring prose and it would be captious to make
much of any deficiencies in this respect. Administrative Agencies and
the Courts is a sane and well documented treatment of a subject that
is becoming more important to the practitioner with each passing year.
Professor Cooper's volume should take its place with the works of
Benjamin, Dickens, Landis, Stason and other scholars in the field.
Edmund A. Stephan*
CAa 3Lu s EVANS HUGHES. By Merlo Pusey.1 New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1951. 2 vol. Pp. xvi, vii, 829. $15.00. - Within its
planned confines this is an engaging book. It is an authorized bio-
graphy, making use of the subject's own notes and aided by a series
of personal interviews with him over the years looking to this publi-
2 60 STAT. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1946).
* Partner in the firm of Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, Chicago.
Authorized biographer.
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cation. And the family has co-operated with private memoranda, let-
ters and advice, though not control. Undoubtedly it is as close to an
official life as we shall get, or should expect. And so we have in
plenteous detail and attractive form a typical American success story
in - to speak only truly - exaggerated form.
For what a success story it was! Here is a poor minister's son who
shows real brilliance at an early age, achieves a striking scholastic
record, and, having chosen the law, seeks his laurel crown in the
difficult area of metropolitan New York. True to the story book tradi-
tion, it does not elude him long and, having married his boss's
daughter, he is soon a recognized leader of his profession. So far the
pattern is not unusual; the metropolitan bar has continually enriched
itself in just such fashion by talent culled from all over the country.
But from then on he breaks forth from the mold, to go on to a career
of thirty-five years of public service which brings him twice to the
Supreme Court, once as its chief, and within a hairbreadth of the
presidency itself. One reviewer has said recently that he had nine
successful careers, instead of a single one.2 Perhaps the number is
still set too low. In any event the amazing thing is that he made a
distinctive mark in each one.
Moreover, all this success was duly earned; none of it appears in
the least fortuitous. (Any one who has lost the presidency by a mere
3775 votes in a single state cannot be held a special favorite of
Lady Luck.) What he accomplished was the result of yoking his
superb mental equipment to an unusual drive and capacity for
sustained and orderly action. Even the typed step of marrying the
boss's daughter was not trite, and was no departure from character;
as Pusey is at pains to point out, he refrained from any attention until
he was already a partner (at the age of twenty-five!). Indeed, Mrs.
Hughes deserves mention in her own right for her part in this story
and her husband's life. No more attractive sections of the book can be
found than the accounts of their continuing love story, lasting for
fifty-seven years, and their gay and affectionate letters to the end.
And she seems to have been that rare person who grew equally with
her husband and took her proper place by his side, no matter how
high the summit he attained. The quip by one of Washington's great
ladies that that city is full of poor boys who have become famous -
and the wives they married before they became famous - is clearly
wide of the mark in its implications, at least as to this gracious lady
who contributed so markedly to her husband's success.
In what I have said I have perhaps indicated what is, to me, the
more interesting part of the work - the recapturing of the man as a
human being in his personal and family relationships. Pusey works
2 Elliston, The Integrity of Jwstice Hughes, 189 ATLANTIc MONT LY No. 4,
73, 74 (1952).
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very hard to show that his hero was not the distant, austere being
so commonly depicted. Possibly he works too hard, with almost a
sense of strain. For after all, Hughes was not a jolly rotarian and
cannot be shown as such. He was a man of innate dignity, and his
mind worked faster than the minds of those he met. Inevitably that
meant some gulf. But Pusey is quite right in showing the friendliness,
the capacity for fun, the gayety underneath, which helped to attract
those close to him and stimulate the intense loyalty he always inspired
in those who worked with him.
One feature of his personal life I wish Pusey might have developed
more as it would have been of particular interest to lawyers. That is,
how he managed to achieve the security he actually had when he
returned to the bench. From various details we can deduce the fol-
lowing: When Hughes first went on the bench in 1910 his salary
was $12,500, later increased to $14,500. After he lost the presidency
in 1916, he had to sell his Washington house in order to start in
practice again. He left the office of Secretary of State because he
needed to recoup his private means. Hence his real start, monetarily
speaking, seems to have been in 1925; in 1930 he was Chief Justice.
In his best year in the interim he made $400,000. But his private
practice was interrupted for his term of service as Judge of the
International Court at The Hague, and significantly reduced when
his son became Solicitor General, since he thereafter refused cases
affecting the Government. Moreover, a long time and much effort was
devoted to service as a Supreme Court master in an important case
where his fee was only $30,000. Interspersed also were continuous
speaking engagements and semi-public service of many kinds. One
infers that during the short period of his active practice - even in
those days of lower taxes - he .must have received a number of very
substantial fees to have made him so swiftly a millionaire. When he
retired from the bench in 1941, he still had a fortune of about $1,200,-
000 and did not need the retirement allowance, but on consideration
took it as desirable policy for the Court.
On the public side of Hughes' career the book should provoke more
controversy - naturally enough in view of the many-sided facets
of his life. Further the book is here marred by that hero worship
which seems an usual occupational disease for authorized biographers,
but is perhaps inevitable for one with such close contacts with so
towering a figure. In a sense this is a disservice to Hughes; Pusey's
picture of him is not of a person growing in power and strength,
but of a figure always the same and always a god. It does, however,
supply a notable set of villains who worked to subvert the hero's high
purposes, including two presidents and several nations. One may say
that even in his choice of enemies Hughes was great!
Nevertheless much material is provided, some of it quite new. As
widely heralded as any is the well-kept secret (till now) that the
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
justices asked Holmes to retire; even that wise realist did not leave
the Court of his own initial volition. The material dealing with Hughes'
tenure as Secretary of State is the most extensive. Pusey evidently
regarded this period with particular satisfaction. He devotes some
200 pages or 50 percent more space to these four years than to the
eleven years of the Chief Justiceship. By contrast the Court crisis of
1937 in the controversy with President Roosevelt - surely one of the
historic events in the history of the Court, if not of the nation -
merited only fifteen pages of direct account and fifteen more of
background.
In future discussions of this great lawyer it is clear that the
material of this book will be a prime source, particularly for the
personal reactions of the subject. But since Hughes touched so many
parts of American life, beginning with his utility and insurance investi-
gations which first brought him deserved fame, and his fighting gover-
norship of New York, through his several careers in Washington,
there is sure to continue an interest in his accomplishments. And dis-
cussion and dispute will inevitably ensue. Now we are too close to
evaluate his real historic stature, as is shown by the responses to the
man himself, in the universally favorable reviews of this book now
appearing.3 When near contemporaries mark him "excellent" in each
of his nine careers, the total impact is so overpowering that one
career alone may hardly be separately dissected. But that comparison
with others of stature in each field will come with time. So, with
some temerity, I suggest future possibilities for discussion in the area
which will remain of lasting concern to the lawyer, namely, that of
his service on the Supreme Court.
Now it can hardly be gainsaid that Hughes was a great judicial
administrator in the conduct of his Court, probably the greatest we
have seen. His devotion to civil rights is beyond all question, being
more consistent than that of even Holmes, as his supporters are justified
in pointing out. And he has shown his mastery of other judicial fields
- the Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, to name two. But I
suggest that he is not a great Chief Justice in the sense of impressing
his individuality upon the status and function of the Court, and of
that, in turn, upon the country, in the sense that Marshall and Taney
were. Consider the claims of his idolaters in this regard. All they claim
in effect is that his was a holding operation, to keep the Court as it
was, to "save" it from the attack of the democratic leader elected by
the people. There appears to be some doubt how much was saved;
but if we concede that the symbolic function of the Court was pre-
3 A partial exception is the interesting review by the contemporary lawyer
and statesman, George Wharton Pepper, who expresses high admiration for
Hughes and then points out some details of difference on important measures.
Pepper, Charles Evans Hughes: Publication of New Biographty Is Major Event,
38 A.B.A.J. 200 (1952).
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served in form, we must still inquire what was preserved in substance.
And we are compelled to answer that we do not yet know - except
that generally the Court's is now a different and a lessened role. The
things it stood for so boldly in the 20's and early 30's vanished with
those opinion days of the spring of 1937; no more complete overthrow
of a conception of judicial function, with not a single open or ex-
pressed regret, can be imagined. For a time it seemed that the Court
might concentrate on civil liberties; more recently it has shown that
such will not be its objective. It had already rejected a role for
which older generations of justices had shown it well fitted, perhaps
best fitted, namely, as an expert court of common law.
All this poses some significant questions. What happened in the 30's
that affairs could so suddenly develop to a crisis without careful
planning and forethought of the judiciary's role? And was that crisis
really resolved by preserving the form and letting substance go? What
the answers may be for future protagonists, for presidents with demo-
cratic programs, or for chief justices who desire their court to be a
continuing effective part of republican government, is anything but
clear. Given a repetition of such strains - and history indicates that
repetition is inevitable - I doubt if the active contestants in that
future crisis will be able to look back to the Hughes period of the
Court with assurance that it contains a lesson; all we can deduce with
assurance is that some change will out.
I realize that one may well urge that no one individual could have
inspired a permanent or lasting solution, that even a John Marshall
could have done no more. That may well be true. It was Marshall's
good fortune to serve his time well; a like feat may now be beyond
the power of any individual man. That truly is a frightening thought!
Americans may make advances in science and physical betterment
that are the wonder of the world; but in the science of living together
they are enmeshed by their past. So we improve the automobile each
year; but we do not improve our methods of meeting and taking care
of the toll of injury and death the machine brings. But underneath
the form, institutions of government do change; unfortunately if we
submit to being bound by the form, then we may not control the
change, but must accept it blindly, whatever its direction. Today we
seem to be suppressing freedom of thought and of expression -
suppression being the present climate of opinion - through the very
forms of law designed to preserve those quite fundamental American
rights. So the Supreme Court's function continues to change as was
begun under Hughes, but without conscious plan or debate as to
direction and course.
I mentioned above the few pages here devoted to the Court fight.
Practically everything stated by Pusey as to it was already publicly
known. The only new factor I noted - and it is one suggesting
intriguing speculations - is that Harlan Stone was disturbed by the
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submission to the Senate Committee of the famous Hughes letter
as to the work of the Court without consultation of the full Court.
But I expect no more space was devoted to this crisis, and to the
drift before it, because actually there was no more to tell. These pro-
found changes in the Court's function and position were occurring
with the justices hardly more than puppet figures swept along by
fate or destiny. Surely there is an insistent question: Couldn't a
John Marshall actually have done more?
Of course all of us, even the greatest, are conditioned by our own
experience. Marshall certainly was a child of his times and his
experience; it happened that this coincided with a country's need.
And so we may in part explain Hughes by his background as a modern
urban lawyer, one eminent in the profession. What is the special forte
of the lawyers of our day? One may suggest that it has been not
innovation, but adjustment, within the norms of known experience.
Hughes certainly showed this. He was, in the best sense of the term,
an ameliorator. He cannot be called a compromiser - that signifies
a viable conscience and a lack of courage, neither of which could be
said of the man who defied the New York Assembly to support the
Socialist members or who consistently and outspokenly upheld all
civil rights. But he did try to work within a given framework. His
campaign for the presidency was but cautious liberalism. Though he
supported the League of Nations in the 1920 campaign, as Secretary
of State he saw that pressure for it was useless and took another
course, that of reduction of armaments. As a justice he went to rather
extreme lengths to distinguish away, rather than overrule, outworn
cases. This, as I pointed out here not long ago, is perhaps the chief
defect in his craftsmanship as a justice; 4 but it is entirely in keeping
with his entire career. To attempt to control or shape the future of
the Court, or to direct it into strange waters, would have been foreign
to his nature. And yet may not bold steps be the wiser in the end?
Perhaps we ask too much to expect this of the brilliant and successful
lawyer; what we may need is something more uncouth, possibly a
country rail-splitter or a doctrinaire college professor!
It appears to be the function of reviewers not only to state, but
shortly to solve, momentous issues overlooked in the books under
review. I have no desire to take such a course; indeed, I have no
ready answers to the questions I raise. But I do think the career of
this great man suggests such questions; having so much we are justified
in asking why he could not have been yet greater. And without be-
littling the worth of this book in the slightest,5 we may hope for
4 Clark, Book Review, 26 NomrR DAmE LAw. 765 (1951), where HENDEI,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1951) was reviewed.
5 Errors seem very few. Taft, while a professor, was never dean of the
Yale Law School, text at 306; Daugherty was not acquitted, but the jury
disagreed, id. at 508.
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further search into the complexities of greatness and the response of
genius and near-genius to problems of unusual magnitude. We are
bound to take this book as the first step in any such search. And
beyond it we can read it for what it also is, an attractive narrative
of a most interesting person, who was not merely a razor-sharp intellect,
but also a gay and happy husband, father and friend.
Charles E. Clark*
SOCIETY AND THE CRIMINAL. By Sir Norwood East.' Springfield,
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1951. Pp. x, 437. $8.50.-This book covers
a broad range of topics dealing with law, psychiatry and various as-
pects of criminal law administration and penology. It comprises nine-
teen chapters, most of which represent extensions of previous ad-
dresses or articles by the author. For this reason there is some repeti-
tion of views, but not in sufficient degree to detract from the solid
worth of the presentation. In fact, this arrangement has some advant-
ages for it enables one to select a particular topic of interest and
secure a fairly complete exposition of the author's views by studying
one chapter.
The first thing that impresses one about the book is the exception-
al experience of the author qualifying him to deal with the wide
range of subjects the book covers. He brings to his task a fine
scientific training in medicine and psychiatry and also the practical
experience of one who -has worked extensively as an important official
and administrator of the criminal law in England, specifically as a
Prison Commissioner and Director of Convict Prisons.
Perhaps the outstanding impression one receives from the book is
the hard-headed practicality of the author who refuses to accept simple
solutions offered by medical authorities for problems which he recog-
nizes from practical experience as being extremely complex. He holds
strongly to the view that the rights of the individual must always
be weighed against the rights and interest of society and he feels that
frequently scientific experts emphasize the individual without due
regard for society.
One major thesis which he emphasizes is the distinction between
criminal responsibility as recognized by the legal profession and
culpability as regarded by medical men. He believes also that many
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
M.D., F.R.C.P. Lecturer on Forensic Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry,
Maudsley Hospital (London University). Formerly, H.M. Commissioner of
Prisons; Inspector of Retreats under the Inebriate Acts; Consultant to the Royal
Navy.
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critics of criminal law and its administration fail to recognize the
modifying influence injected into administration by the constant
efforts of legal and executive officers to modify suitably the punish-
ment and treatment of offenders.
The statement regarding the McNaghten Rules which form the
commonly accepted test of legal insanity gives a good insight to the
author's point of view: 2
It is a well-known fact that some lawyers and doctors from time to
time express their disapproval of the so called McNaghten Rules in cases
where criminal responsibility is contested. It is alleged that the law in this
matter is antiquated and unfair. But one is sometimes forced to wonder
how much first hand acquaintance the critics have in the matter. For
their proposals are sometimes highly controversial, and fail to provide for
a practical, reliable and effective alternative. It must be remembered
that the Rules are retained because no one has improved upon them
in a manner which leaves the issue still clear to the jury. Some critics seem
to be unaware of the way in which the law operates, or of the signifi-
cance of the oft repeated ieference in the Court of Criminal Appeal to the
powers frequently exercised by the Secretary of State under the Criminal
Lunatics Act, 1884.
There is no doubt that this book can be recommended for study
by any student of the criminal law and its administration, for it
presents a sane, practical and yet highly scientific treatment of some
of the most complex problems surrounding criminal responsibility and
the treatment of offenders. It is believed that it will be through efforts
by men such as the author, who combine thorough medical training
with practical training and experience in the administration of criminal
law, that the gap between the law and scientific investigation will
eventually be bridged.
Joseph A. McClain, Jr.*
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Owen J. Roberts.' Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. 102.
$2.00. - Three lectures on constitutional law, delivered by former
Justice Roberts as the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures for 1951 at
Harvard University, have been made available to the public in this
book. The areas selected by the author for consideration are taxation,
regulation and due process. The unifying and limiting theme is the
relationship of the nation and the states in our dual system of govern-
ment.
2 Text at 417.
* Dean, College of Law, Duke University.
- Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Former Associate Justice,
United States Supreme Court.
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The first lecture is largely a survey of the development of the doc-
trine of intergovernmental immunities with respect to taxation. The
author quotes rather extensively from the opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland 2 and observes that: 3 "Here is an avowal that the Court
is not construing the words of the Constitution, but enforcing the
principles on which it rests." The author further states that: 4
This case was the forerunner of a series of some eighty cases of major
importance dealing with state taxation of federal activities and federal
taxation of state activities. In no field of federal jurisprudence has there
been greater variation and uncertainty.
Students of constitutional law will be particularly interested in the
author's occasional adverse comments on the Court's majority and
dissenting opinions. For example, concerning the dissent in Panhandle
Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox,5 he remarks that he does "not
understand the later view of Mr. Justice Holmes." 6 It will be recalled
that it was in that dissent that Holmes said that the "power to tax
is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." 7 Discussing James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 8 the author says that: 9 "The opinion of
the Court labored valiantly, and, as I think, unsuccessfully, to dis-
tinguish the earlier cases." More severe is the comment on United
States v. County of Allegheny 10 for the author indicates: 11
It is difficult to justify the result in the light of the progressive
subjection of contractors to nondiscriminatory state taxation on the
proceeds of contracts with the United States, or on their property used in
performance of the contract. The tax was not a direct tax on the property
of the United States, as the Court held. It seems that, in effect, the Court
has reintroduced, under the formula of direct taxation, the discarded test
of economic burden.
The author also says that the opinion in Clallam County v. United
States 12 "was wholly vague as to the reasons for the decision." 13
This comment and one previously noted are the only references in the
lectures to Mr. Justice Holmes.
The last group of tax cases discussed in the first lecture consists of
those in which a state operates what might be considered a business,
2 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819).
3 Text at 6.
4 Id. at 9.
5 277 U.S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857 (1928).
6 Text at 12.
7 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223, 48 S. Ct.
451, 72 L. Ed. 857 (1928).
8 302 U.S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155 (1937).
9 Text at 18.
10 322 U.S. 174, 64 S. Ct. 908, 88 L. Ed. 1209 (1944).
11 Text at 19.
12 263 U.S. 341, 44 S. Ct. 121, 68 L. Ed. 328 (1923).
13 Text at 21.
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such as selling liquor or bottled mineral water. The author observes
that such cases present "perhaps the most difficult situation that has
faced the Court." 14
He concludes his discussion of intergovernmental immunities with
several comments, one of which is as follows: 15 "Most of the immuni-
ties so carefully built up on McCulloch v. Maryland have subsequently
been swept away. In any practical view of the subject, more should
go." Noteworthy also is the fact that in these concluding comments
not only is disagreement with Mr. Justice Frankfurter registered on
the power of Congress to provide for immunities from state taxation,16
but also there is the suggestion that Chief Justice Marshall was per-
haps "wrong when he said that the question was not one of 'confidence'
but one of power." 17
Because of the momentous change in the attitude of the Court
towards the regulation of economic affairs by the Federal Government,
which change took place while the author was a member of the Court,
the second lecture, relating to conflicts in police power, is of more
general interest than the first. Readers expecting revelations as to
what went on behind the scenes in 1937 will be sorely disappointed.
We are told that: 18
The continual expansion of federal power with consequent contraction
of state powers probably has been inevitable. The founders of the
Republic envisaged no such economic and other expansion as the nation
has experienced. Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could
have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the
country - for what in effect was a unified economy. It may be that
in a sense the resort of Congress to the taxing power, to the general
welfare power, and to the commerce power as means to reach a result
never contemplated when the Constitution was adopted, was a subterfuge.
An insistence by the Court on holding federal power to what seemed its
appropriate orbit when the Constitution was adopted might have resulted
in even more radical changes in our dual structure than those which have
been gradually accomplished through the extension of the limited jurisdic-
tion conferred on the federal government.
Perhaps this explanation is the best we could hope for from the
former Associate Justice. His urbane and temperate language con-
trasts very favorably with the tirades of those who rail at their
opponents on constitutional issues, referring to them as "illiterates."
The third lecture, relating to the Fourteenth Amendment, neces-
sarily embraces a great variety of situations. The vast materials are
admirably handled, including those with respect to freedom of speech.
14 Id. at 27.
15 Id. at 32.
16 Id. at 34.
17 Id. at 35.
18 Id. at 61-2.
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The author says that 19 "the decision that the liberties protected by
the due process clause included those to be implied from the provisions
of the First Amendment. . was the most sweeping judicial extension
of federal power over state action in the history of the republic." He
also states that 20 "It is within the possibilities that soon the Court
will adopt the view of the present minority that due process is
shorthand for the text of the first eight amendments.
The book is a boon to the neophyte in constitutional law since it
provides an authoritative, rapid survey of three highly important
bodies of constitutional doctrine in excellent English prose. All citizens,
and especially all students, should find it profitable.
Roger Paul Peters*
THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY. Vd1. III. By Richard R. Powell.'
Albany and New York City: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 1952.
Pp. ix, 880. $18.50. - It is a difficult assignment to review the third
volume of a proposed five volume treatise on the law of real property,
and it is even more difficult when one knows that the third volume
contains only a portion (the latter chapters of subhead two through
six of eight subheads) of the materials which comprise Part III of the
projected five Parts. Part III, entitled "Permissible Interests in Land,"
according to the author represents roughly 40% of the treatise.2
The materials covered in Volume Three include the closing chapters
(dealing with some constructional problems) of the subhead dealing
with future interests, and the subheads dealing with powers of appoint-
ment, easements, franchises and security interests.
That which is written in Volume Three must be considered in the
light of the expressed purposes of the entire treatise. There is evidence
of the same bitter conflict between Professor Powell, the objective
scholar,3 and Professor Powell, the impatient evangelist,4 as has been
19 Id. at 73.
20 Id. at 88.
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia University, and Reporter on Property
for the American Law Institute.
2 1 PowE=L, REAL PRoPERTY 4 (1949).
3 Id. at 2. "The background, even of considerable remoteness in time, is
essential to any real understanding of what today's rule really requires. Further-
more, statesmanship in the law of land requires perspective, a comprehension of
the workings of the whole social organism, an awareness of the processes of
evolution which are constantly at work in even the least regenerate of the
fields of law."
4 Id. at 236. "Strict following of early English rules has made the juris-
prudence of Illinois, in some particulars, distinctly anachronistic." And in the
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evidenced in earlier parts of the treatise, and in certain areas of the
Restatement of the Law of Property. The resolution of this conflict is
not the suppression of the historical background and evolution, but
rather the training of lawyers and the selection of judges whose
scholarship will require them to reject any notion that rules of con-
struction, devised to reach the results consistent with the facts of one
period of time, should be crystallized into rules of law which are quite
inappropriate to the needs of society, when applied in another period
of time.
Professor Powell, with able advocacy, urges that old rules be not
applied to modern situations (where the reason for the application of
the rule has long since ceased to exist) in his chapters dealing with
the constructional problems inherent in gifts over on death, or on
death without issue, other miscellaneous construction problems, and
class gifts. He relies heavily in these areas on the authority of the
Restatement of the Law of Property, for which he was the Reporter
and for which he synthesized the research of many persons which
produced a work which was much more than a restatement of the law
of property. He considers also the legal consequences of the interests
of expectant distributees.
In his treatment of powers of appointment, Professor Powell, quite
properly, deviates from his purpose as stated when the work on the
treatise was beginning. 5 Some time after June 28, 1951, Professor
Powell realized that not even the most superficial coverage of the legal
consequences of powers of appointment could be made without con-
sidering the impact of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951.6 Con-
sequently, he includes an adequate discussion of the effect of an act
of federal tax legislation on the substantive law of powers.r He
recognizes that, for all practical purposes, this federal tax legislation
has become a part of the substantive law of powers of appointment.
With the same meticulous care, Professor Powell considers the
problems which arise from the recognized legal interests of easements,
licenses and some franchises.
The latter chapters of Volume Three are concerned with security
interests in real property. Professor Powell ably distinguishes between
the voluntary security interests in the area where state policy permits
footnote keyed to this quotation it is stated: "This is particularly true with
respect to the law of future interests, as to which Albert Kales' great knowledge
of the early English law, helped the Supreme Court of Illinois to reincarnate
much which has been elsewhere left decently interred."
5 Under Paragraph 4, Exclusions, id. at 3, Professor Powell observed, "Con-
demnation and taxation are topics which are logically within the field. Yet each of
these topics is so large a field that a separate volume would be required for
its proper treatment. These are fields for specialists." [Emphasis supplied.]
G Pub. L. No. 58, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 28, 1951).
7 3 PowELL, REAL PRoPERTY 328 et seq. (1952).
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individuals to create such interests, the interests where the legislative
policy of the state has defined the rights for the benefit of non-
governmental creditors, and the governmental security interests (where
the state, as such, has an interest).
Volume Three is only a segment of a treatise written by a great
scholar of the law of real property, but a scholar, nevertheless, who
is an equally great advocate for the policy decisions which he believes
should be made. Volume Three is not only a pronouncement of what
the law is, but also what it should be. Regardless of the ultimate
decision of history, Volume Three is a, part of an outstanding work,
which will be one of the timeless monuments of American legal
scholarship.
Leon H. Wallace*
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